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t is my pleasure to speak with you today, and I thank
Bill McDonoughandtheFederalReserveBankofNewYork
forinviting me to participate in this conference.The subject of
theconference,theimpactoffinancialinnovationonmonetary
policy, is one of fundamental interest tocentral banks. Bill has
asked me to provide my thoughts on one of the important
structural changes of recent years: consolidation in theglobal
financial system and its ramifications for monetary policy and
other areas of central bank concern.
Consolidation of all types of business activities has been
a prominent feature of the economic landscape for at
least the past decade. The financial sector has participated
actively in this development. Indeed, the past few years have
witnessed an acceleration of consolidation among financial
institutions.
In recognition of the importance of this marketplace
evolution,and especially its potentialeffects on awiderange of
public policies, the finance ministers and centralbank
governors of the Group of Ten nations in September 1999
commissioneda major study of the possible effectsof financial
consolidation on matters of policy concern to central banks
and finance ministries in the G-10. This study, which I was
privilegedto direct, wasreleased to the public in January 2001.
Today, I would like to discuss the study’s major findings and
their implications.
The G-10 Study of Financial
Consolidation
The G-10 study had two primary objectives. It attempted to
isolatetheeffectsofconsolidationfromthoseofotherpowerful
forces transforming our financial systems, and to identify key
areas in which financial consolidationrequires new or
acceleratedpolicydevelopment.Thediversityoftheeconomies
involved—even among the G-10, Australia, and Spain—and
the interdependent nature of many of the forces affecting our
financial systems made achieving these objectives difficult, to
say the least. However, I believe the study was a success.
Patterns and Causes
With a study of the depth, breadth, and, quite frankly, the
length of this one, it is always potentially dangerous and even
possibly misleading to summarize the key points in a few
words. However, I believe that policymakers should
communicate to a wide audience their thinking on important
policy concerns, and thereby stimulate and contribute to
dialogues in the public and private sectors. Thus, despite the
risks, I would like to highlight what are, in my judgment, the
study’s key findings and policy implications.
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The report documents that, in the nations studied, a high
level of merger and acquisition activity occurred during the
1990s among financial firms, defined to include depository
institutions,securitiesfirms,andinsurancecompanies.During
the decade, approximately 7,500 transactions, valued at
roughly$1.6 trillion, wereconsummated. Moreover, thepace
of consolidation increased over time, including a noticeable
acceleration in the last threeyears of the decade. For example,
the annual number of deals increased threefold during the
1990s, and the total value of deals increased almost tenfold. In
Europe,roughly two-thirdsof merger and acquisition activity,
as measured by thevalueof the European firm acquired,
occurred during the decade’s last threeyears. According to a
variety of measures, the United States accounted for about
55 percent of M&A activity, partly because of our historically
large number of relatively small financial firms. However, it is
also true that many very large U.S. banking institutions
expanded their geographic footprint by acquiring other very
large banks, especially later in the decade.
Most of the past decade’s merger and acquisition activity
in the financial sector involved banking organizations.
Acquisitions of banking firms accounted for 60 percent of all
financial mergers and 70 percent of the value of those mergers
in the nations studied. In addition, most M&A transactions
involved firmscompeting in the same segment of the financial
services industry within the same country, while domestic
mergers involving firms in different segments of the overall
financialservicesindustrywerethesecondmostcommontype
oftransaction.Cross-bordermergersandacquisitionswereless
frequent, especially those involving firms in different industry
segments. Still, all types of mergersandacquisitions—whether
within one country or cross-border and whether withinone
industry segment or across segments—increased in frequency
and value during the 1990s.
Joint ventures and strategic alliances provide aninteresting
contrast with some of the patterns in outright mergers and
acquisitions. As with M&A activity, the number of joint
ventures and strategic alliances increased during the 1990s,
with especially large increases in the last two years. In the
United States, which accounted for nearly half of all joint
ventures and strategic alliances, the arrangements were
overwhelmingly domestic. However, in the other twelve
countries studied, cross-border joint ventures and strategic
alliances overall exceeded domestic deals.
Our research shows that financial consolidation
substantiallydecreasedthenumberofbankingfirmsduringthe
1990s in almost every nation studied, and measures of the
nationalconcentration of thebanking industryhave tended to
rise. Still, at the nationallevel, the structure of the banking
industry continues to differ greatly, ranging from very
unconcentrated in a few nations—the United States and
Germany—to highly concentrated in about half of the nations
in our study. In contrast to banking, there are no consistent
patterns across countries in changes in the number of
insurance firms or concentration in the insurance industry
during the 1990s. Within the securities industry, several
specific activities, such as certain types of underwriting, are
dominated by a small number of leading institutions. It is
unclear,however,whether this pattern changedmuch overthe
1990s.
Oneofthemostimportant conclusionsof ourstudyisthat
financial consolidation has helped to create a significant
number of large, and insome cases increasingly complex,
financial institutions. In addition, these firms increasingly
operateacross nationalborders and are subject to awide range
of regulatory regimes. These observations have several
important implications, which I shall return to in a moment.
Ourwork findsthatthemostimportantforcesencouraging
financial consolidation are improvements in information
technology, financial deregulation, globalization of financial
and nonfinancial markets, and increased shareholder pressure
for financialperformance. Becausewe expect theseforces to
continue,weexpectfinancialconsolidationtocontinueaswell,
even though the pace may be interrupted by swings in the
macroeconomic cycle and other factors. The study considers
few possible futurescenarios but concludesthatthe likelihood
of specific future developments is impossible to assess with
confidence. My own guess is that various patterns will emerge.
Globally active, universal financial services providers will
continue to emerge. We should also see the further
development of firms specialized in the production of
particular components of financialservices or in the
distributiontoendusersofproductsobtainedfromspecialized
providers—providers that may exist within or outside the
traditional financial services industry. I fully expect a large
number of efficient and profitable small and medium-sized
financialinstitutionstoremainimportantplayersintheUnited
States. I would guess this will also be the case in many other
nations. In addition, the uncertainties of successful post-
merger integration may well favor more use of looser forms of
consolidation, such as joint ventures and strategic alliances.
Monetary Policy
One of our more important policy concerns in designing the
study—and the issue of greatest relevance to the participants
in this conference—was the potential effect of financial
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policy. There were three broad areas of concern. First, it
seemedpossiblethatconsolidationcouldmakeitmoredifficult
for central banks to implement policy if it reduced the
efficiencyofthemarketforcentralbankreservesorthemarkets
used in the conduct of monetary policy operations. For
example, consolidation might reduce the liquidity or increase
thevolatilityofthereservesmarket,makingitmoredifficultfor
central banks to keep their policy rate near its target. The
second possibility was that consolidation could affect the
transmission mechanism linking changes in the policy interest
rate to the real economy. Consolidation could do soifit
affected the liquidity or volatility of key financial markets and
the arbitraging of interest rates across instruments and
maturities. Moreover, consolidation could, at least in theory,
alter the credit channels of monetarypolicy. For example, if
consolidation fostered the creation of larger banks having
better access to markets for managed liabilities, it could affect
the way that theavailability and pricing of bank loansadjustin
response to changes in the stance of monetary policy. Third,
consolidation might affect the environment in which policy is
conducted. This could occur if consolidation led to the faster
transmissionofshocksacrossmarketsorgeographical regions,
oraffectedthebehaviorofindicatorvariablessuchasmonetary
and credit aggregates used by monetary policymakers.
Consolidation could also affect the policy environment by
contributing to the formation of very large and complex
financial institutions: difficulties at such firms could pose
challenges for central banks in both their monetarypolicyand
lender-of-last-resort roles.
Despite these concerns, the study finds that financial
consolidationhasnotsignificantlyaffectedtheabilityofcentral
bankstoachievetheobjectivesofmonetarypolicy.Whyisthis?
Bill English will provide more detail tomorrow, but let me try
to explain briefly.
As part of our research, we asked central banks in all the
nationsstudiedabouttheirexperienceswithconsolidationand
the implementation of monetary policy. Virtually all reported
that they had experienced at most minor effects, and that they
did not expect the effects to be largein coming years. A key
reason for this finding is that even with the substantial
consolidation we have observed, the financial markets most
importantformonetarypolicyhavegenerallyremainedhighly
competitive. Even in those nations where consolidation has
been considerable, competitive behavior has generally been
sustained by the possibility that new firms could enter the
markets at relatively low cost. It is also well worth noting that
our work suggests that the development of the euro has been
particularlyhelpfulinmaintainingcompetitioninEurope.The
euro has encouraged development ofEuropean money and
capital markets, thus making the number of participants in a
particular nation’s markets less relevant.
The central banks also indicated that the effects of
consolidation on the monetary transmission mechanism
have been small. Some of the central banks thought that
consolidation could have more significant effects if its pace
accelerated for a time, but the likely nature of the resulting
changes wasuncertain. Moreover,frequent reviews ofthedata
should allow centralbanks to take account of anyfuture
changes whensetting policy.
Similarly, the central bankers we spoke with did not think
that consolidation had importantly affected the environment
for policy. They generally reported that consolidation had not
adversely affected the operation of financialmarkets andthat
the effect of consolidation on the behavior of indicator
variables was quite small. Clearly, in the event of financial
difficulties at a very large and complex institution, central
banks would need to evaluate carefully the appropriate level
and duration of emergency liquidity provision, as well as the
possibleneedtoadjust,perhapsonly forashortperiodoftime,
the stance of monetary policy.
On balance, and despite these positive results, our study
recommends that central banks should remain alert to the
implicationsofanyfuturereductions in thecompetitivenessof
themarkets most important formonetary policy implemen-
tation.Similarly, we suggest that central banks ought to
monitor potential future effects on the transmission
mechanismformonetarypolicy.Monetarypolicyissimplytoo
important to the health of all our economies to do otherwise.
Financial Risk
Financial consolidation can affect the risksto bothindividual
financial institutions and the financial system as a whole.
Significantly,our study concludes that existing policies appear
adequatetocontainindividualfirmandsystemicrisksnowand
in the intermediate term. However, looking further ahead,
the study identifies several topics that deserve careful
attention by policymakers.
For example, we conclude that thepotential effects of
financial consolidation on the risk of individual financial
institutions are mixed and that the net result is impossible to
generalize. Thus, we must evaluate individual firm risk on a
case-by-case basis. Consolidation seems most likely to reduce
risk through diversification gains, although even here the
possibilities are complex. On the one hand, diversification
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nation and across national borders. On the other hand, after
consolidation, some firms shift toward riskier asset portfolios,
andconsolidationmayincreaseoperatingrisksandmanagerial
complexities for those firms. Diversification gains may also
result from consolidation across financial products and
services, although research suggests that the potential benefits
may be fairly limited. In part because the net impact of
consolidation on individual firmriskis unclear,the net impact
ofcons olidat iononsystemicriskisalsouncertain.However,as
I noted, consolidation clearly has encouraged thecreation of a
number of large and increasingly complex financial
institutions. Our studysuggests that if such an institution
became seriously distressed, consolidation and any attendant
complexity might increase the chance that winding down the
organization would be difficult or disorderly.
We recommend thatthe risksto individual firmsandtothe
financial system could be reduced by stepped-up efforts to
understand the implications of working out a large and
complex financial institution. Because no institution is too big
tofail, I believethat regulators should develop a clearer
understanding of, for example, the administration of
bankruptcy laws and conventions across borders; the
coordinationofsupervisorypolicieswithinandacrossborders;
the treatment of over-the-counter derivatives, foreign
exchange, and other “market” activities in distress situations;
the roles and responsibilities of managers and boards of
directors; and the administration of the lender-of-last-resort
function. I say stepped-up discussions are needed insome of
t h e s ea r e a sb e c a u s ec o n s i d e r i n ga d v e r s ed e v e l o p m e n t si so r
should be a normal activity in all countries. Our study helps to
clarify the need for international attention to this topic.
Consolidation, and especially any resulting increased
complexity of financial institutions, appear to haveincreased
both market participants’ demand for and institutions’ supply
of information regarding a firm’s financial condition. The
resulting rise in disclosures has probably improved firm
transparency and encouraged market discipline and has thus
lowered individual firm risk and perhaps increased financial
stability. However, the increased complexity of firms has also
made them more opaque, and their increased size has the
potential to augment moral hazard. Thus, the net effect of
consolidation onfirm transparency and market discipline is
unclear. Indeed, we conclude that there appears to be
considerableroomforimprovementindisclosures byfinancial
institutions.
Our study suggests that both crisis prevention and crisis
managementcouldbeimprovedbyadditionalcommunication
and cooperation among central banks, finance ministries, and
other financial supervisors, domestically and internationally.
Indeed, the study strongly supports existing efforts in these
areas. In our view, the most important initiatives include
proposals to improve the risk sensitivity of the international
BaselCapitalAccordandbanksupervisionandeffortsaimedat
improving market discipline. A critical element of improved
risk-based supervision is risk-based capital standards that are
tied more closely to economic risk. Capital standards provide
an anchor for virtually all other supervisory and regulatory
actions and can support and improve both supervisory and
market discipline. For example, early intervention policies
triggeredby more accurate capital standards could prove to be
important in crisis prevention.
Payment and Settlement Systems
Financial consolidation is affecting the market structures for
payment and securities settlement as well as banks’ internal
systems and procedures forpaymentand back-officeactivities.
Our studyconcludes that, on balance, financial consolidation
has led to a greater concentration of payment and settlement
flows among fewer parties. Fortunately, our analysis indicates
that the greater concentration of payment flows does not
appear to have decreased competition in markets for payment
and settlement services. However, we suggest that it would be
advisable for government authorities to continue to monitor
competition in the payment system.
In contrast, our work indicates that we should closely
monitor therisk implications ofconsolidation in payment and
settlement systems. On the one hand, consolidation may help
toimprovetheeffectivenessofinstitutions’credit andliquidity
riskcontrols.Forexample,increasedconcentrationofpayment
flows may allow institutions to get a more comprehensive
picture ofsettlement exposures orcreatea greaterability tonet
internal payment flows. In addition, central banks have made
major efforts over recent decades to contain and reduce
systemic risk byoperating and promoting real-time gross
settlement systems and by insisting on the implementation of
risk control measures in net settlement systems. On the other
hand, consolidation may lead to a significantshiftof risk from
interbank settlement systems, where risk management may be
more robust and transparent, to customer banks and third-
partyservice providers, whererisk management practices may
be harder for users to discern. In addition, to the extent that
consolidation results in a greater concentration of payment
flows, the potential effects of an operationalproblem may
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These and other developments imply that centralbank
oversight of the risks in interbank payment systems is
becoming more closely linked with traditional supervision of
individual institutions’ safety and soundness. As a result, we
conclude that increasing cooperation and communication
between banking supervisors and payment system overseers
may be necessary both domestically and internationally.
Efficiency, Competition, and Credit Flows
Our study concludes with an extensive evaluation of the
potential effects of financial consolidation on the efficiency of
financial institutions, competition among such firms, and
credit flows to households and small businesses. The study
determines that although consolidation has some potential to
i m p r ov eop e r at i n ge ff i c i e n c y ,a n dh a sd on es oi ns o mec a s e s ,
the overall evidence in favor of efficiency gains is weak. Thus,
we suggest that policymakers should carefully examine claims
of substantial efficiency gains in proposed consolidations,
especially in cases where a merger could raise significant issues
of market power.
Ourworkalsoattemptstoshedsomelightonwhyacademic
researchers are less optimistic than business practitioners
regarding the potential for consolidation to lead to efficiency
gains.Wesuggestfourpossiblereasons,whicharenotmutually
exclusive. First, practitioners may consider cost reductions or
revenueincreasespersetobeasuccess,withoutalsotakinginto
account independentindustry trendsasa benchmark. Second,
managers may focus on absolute cost savings rather than on
efficiency measures that compare costs with some other
v a r i a b l e ,s u c ha sa s s e t so rr e v e n u e s .T h i r d ,r e s e a r c hf i n d sl i t t l e
or no efficiency improvements on average, but this also means
that some institutions may improve efficiency while some
suffer from lower efficiency. Managers with inside knowledge
of their firm may be justified in believing that their institution
mi g h tbea m on gt h os ei m p r ov i n ge f f i ci e n c yt hr o ug hame rg e r
or acquisition. Lastly, past M&As may have suffered from
regulationsthatreducedthebenefits,andsuchregulationsmay
not exist in the future.
Theeffectsofconsolidationoncompetitionandcreditflows
are case-specific and depend on the nature of markets for
individual products and services. Some markets, such as those
for wholesale financial services, generally show few problems.
Others, such as those for retail products and services, some-
times experience problems from consolidation. Thus, as with
other issues addressed by our study, a case-by-case evaluation
of therelevant facts is required.
Conclusion
Financialconsolidationclearlyisapowerfulforcethatisdeeply
affecting the evolution of the financial system of the United
States and many other nations. A thorough understanding of
thisforceanditspotentialeffectsiscriticalforprudentdecision
making inboth the public and private sectors. I believe the
study that I have just summarized takes some major steps
toward that understanding, and I hope that my remarks have
helped you to comprehend our study’s findings and
implications. Still, all of us have much to learn, and much of
what weknow todaywillalmost surely changein the future.
I commend the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for seeking
to advance our knowledge, and I thank you again for inviting
me to contribute.